Recently exchanges have been supplementing their tape revenue by directly selling trade and quote data to some traders. We analyze how this practice affects the cost of capital, market liquidity and welfare by studying a twoperiod economy in which rational traders can purchase information about past transactions from the exchanges. In an economy in which traders are endowed with private signals about asset value, allowing the exchange to sell price data increases the cost of capital and worsens market liquidity relative to a world in which all traders freely observe previous prices. However, selling price data reduces the cost of capital and increases liquidity relative to an economy in which no traders can observe price information. If traders have to decide whether to purchase private signals, as well as whether to purchase price data, selling price data can cause traders to reduce their effort to gather information on the underlying asset. This secondary effect may increase the equilibrium cost of capital, but paradoxically it results in greater liquidity. Our welfare analysis also shows that as more previous price information is present in the market, noise traders are made better-off and speculative rational traders are made worse-off. In our view, allowing exchanges to sell price information is undesirable because it generally reduces efficiency and market quality. We believe that the practice should be restricted.
Introduction
Price information plays a crucial role in securities markets. Knowing trade prices helps traders understand the current value of financial assets. Knowing quote prices helps traders estimate where and at what price their orders will execute. Because of this fundamental role, securities regulators in the US mandated the formation of a consolidated tape to provide real time information on every trade execution in the US markets. Complementing this trade data is a similarly comprehensive set of quote data from every market, which when sorted into the highest price to sell (offer) and lowest price to buy (bid) results in the National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO). Because brokers have a duty of best execution to their customers, the NBBO plays a further role of establishing where orders must be routed to receive the best price and the priority in which orders are filled. Tape data and the NBBO thus play a pivotal role in facilitating the process of price discovery and liquidity provision in U.S. securities markets.
Trade and quote data also provide a major source of revenue for exchanges in the U.S. The exchanges jointly own the Consolidated Tape Association and the Consolidated Quote Association which together sell the comprehensive quote and trade data available on the tape. Exchanges share in the tape revenue depending upon the volume of trades and the production of quotes in each market. Recently, however, some exchanges have found a way to supplement their tape revenue by directly selling trade and quote data.
1 Purchasers of the data benefit in that they see the data before it appears on the consolidated tape, while exchanges benefit by essentially selling the same data twice, albeit at different speeds. What is less clear is whether the market benefits from this practice.
In this paper we investigate what happens when some traders can 1 The NYSE sells a variety of direct data feeds via its products NYSE Best Quote, NYSE Open Book, and NYSE Amex Best quote. Nasdaq sells its trade and quote data directly under the product name Nasdaq ITCH. Arcapelago (a part of NYSE/Euronext) also sells trade and quote. BATS and Direct Edge provide data feeds from their markets but currently do not charge for this data. In Europe, the London Stock Exchange, the Deutshe Borse and virtually all of the major exchanges sell price and trade data. The Deutshe Borse, for example, recently introduced a new data product "MIFID Post Trade" providing trade prices and volumes for securities traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange and the Tradegate Exchange.
see price information before other traders. Purchasing fast data (along with practices such as co-location of trading terminals with exchange computers) gives rise to a practice called "latency arbitrage" whereby some traders are able to trade before other traders (see Easley, Hendershott, and Ramadorai (2010) and Hendershott and Moulton (2008) for analyses of latency issues in equity markets). Our analysis captures the effects of differential access to price information on traders' behavior and on equilibrium price formation. We show that differential access generally increases the cost of capital relative to what it would have been if all traders saw the same price data. This negative effect arises because "price informed" traders benefit at the expense of "non-price informed" traders who in turn scale back their trading to offset this increased risk. Relative to a world in which all traders observe price, the equilibrium with data selling serves mainly to enhance exchange profit at the expense of other traders and potentially the equity risk premium.
We also show, however, that selling differential information may improve the cost of capital relative to what it would be if no traders were able to observe price information. This is because the trades of "price informed" agents result in prices being more informative, which in turn makes it less risky for traders to hold the asset. This result may have particular relevance for European securities markets which currently do not have a consolidated tape. Allowing exchanges to sell data in this world would reduce the cost of capital by making prices more informative. Nonetheless, the cost of capital would be lower still if price data were available to all traders. We use calibration results to illustrate the magnitude of these effects, as well as to demonstrate the normative effects on trader welfare and exchange profit.
Selling price data also has interesting effects on market liquidity and the information structure of financial assets. When rational traders all freely receive signals on asset value, we find that liquidity effects and cost of capital effects are congruent. That is, the cost of capital is lower and the market liquidity is higher when price information is more widely available. When traders have to purchase both asset-signals and price-data, however, the equilibrium becomes more complex. In some equilibria, price data can "crowd out" asset signal data, leading traders to reduce their purchase of fundamental data. This substitution can lead to a higher cost of capital, but paradoxically also to greater liquidity. These results underscore the complex interactions of both fundamental and market data on equilibrium price formation.
Our paper is related to a variety of research investigating the role of information in securities markets. A number of authors, most notably Admati and Pfleiderer (1990) , Allen (1999) , Fishman and Hagerty (1995) , have considered the issue of selling information in financial markets, although typically in the context of analysts selling fundamental information to other traders. In our setting, the exchange does not trade on the data, so the strategic decision to trade for one's self or to sell the data to others that this literature focuses on does not arise. Our analysis extends this literature, however, by showing how price data can substitute for fundamental data, thereby introducing another dimension into the trade-offs facing holders (and sellers) of fundamental data. Boulatov and Dierker (2007) also consider the interaction of fundamental data and price data, but in their Kyle-model based analysis these data sources operate as complements. In their analysis, price data is only valuable to the extent it combines with fundamental data. These authors show that data sales in this context can generate increased stock market monitoring.
There is also a large literature examining differential access to information in the context of insider trading (see, for example, Leland (1992) ; Glosten (1989) ; Fishman and Hagerty (1990) ). In our model, traders all have, or at least have equal access to, information regarding the underlying asset value. But a novel direction exploited here is that some traders have "inside information" with respect to the information from the trading process. In common with this earlier literature, we find that this form of differential information can also induce welfare, liquidity, and cost of capital effects in equilibrium. In particular, our finding that greater availability of price data can lower the cost of capital complements Leland's finding that more insider trading can have a similar positive effect in the market.
A recent paper by Cespa and Foucault (CF) (2008) also investigates the role of ticker price data in securities markets. While our paper and theirs share a similar interest, the two papers differ in both orientation and results. CF use a random endowment, multi-period rational expectations model to investigate the normative question of the optimal fraction of traders to be price informed in an economy. They find that the Pareto optimal market structure is either fully opaque or has limited transparency. They also show how this optimal level of transparency can be achieved by charging a fee (a Pigovian tax) for price information designed to curb excessive acquisition of price information. By contrast, our paper addresses the positive question of what happens when an exchange can sell information. Our analysis uses a Grossman-Stigliz style analysis with noise traders and positive net supply to analyze how price information affects the cost of capital, liquidity, welfare and the information structure of markets. We find that markets outcomes are "better" in the sense of a lower cost of capital and greater liquidity when price data is freely available to all (i.e. markets are fully transparent). 2 We also examine how selling data affects trader welfare and exchange profitability.
The divergence in results between the two models arises from two main differences in the analyses. First, the random endowments model assumes that traders transact in advance of knowing their endowments. Trading then allows traders to hedge this endowment risk, and it is this hedging demand that makes greater opacity desirable. By contrast, our model uses a noise trader framework to introduce randomness, and speculative demands predominate in the equilibrium. Given that latency in our context can be extremely low, we find the noise trader approach a more appealing construct for addressing this issue. A second difference in the models arises from assumptions regarding per capita supply. In CF, this supply is zero and consequently their analysis cannot address issues related to the cost of capital (which is always zero in their model under any structure). By contrast, the cost of capital plays a pivotal role in our analysis because changes in the availability of price data change the risk confronting traders not holding this data, and their subsequent demand to be compensated changes equilibrium prices and liquidity. We believe this framework is a more natural setting to investigate issues related to the desirability of allowing exchanges to sell data, an issue that is now a major policy debate both in the U.S. and in Europe.
We develop the implications of our research for this debate and our recommendations for regulatory policy in more detail later in the paper. Of particular importance, we argue that the "fairness" criterion the SEC has proposed to evaluate these issues is misguided, and we propose an alternative criterion to guide regulatory decision-making in this area. We also argue that some types of data selling should be prohibited. We note, however, at the outset some limitations of our analysis. Our focus on equilibrium issues means that we are not able to examine how selling price data affects traders' quote-setting behavior or their decisions to use particular order forms, each of which may have important short-term liquidity effects. While acknowledging the importance of these microstructure-based issues, we believe that policy analysis should focus more on the equilibrium effects of selling price data on the cost of capital, market liquidity, and trader welfare. A more practical concern may be whether our model is actually capturing economically important effects. In Europe, there is no consolidated tape, so exchange data products give traders information not available elsewhere. In the US, exchange data products provide traders with information before it appears on the tape. For some data, the delay may be measured in seconds (or parts thereof), but other data (such as odd lot prices or information on reserve orders) are never reported to the tape. Given the speed at which high frequency trading now occurs, we would argue that any delay now matters for the market equilibrium. Our paper is thus best viewed as providing results at this fundamental level.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set out the model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium in the asset and price-information markets and derives implications for the cost of capital. The welfare implications of various requirements about price disclosure are discussed in section 4. In section 5 we generalize the analysis to make the acquisition of private information endogenous and describe the resulting complex effects on the equilibrium and welfare. Finally, section 6 discusses the implications of our analysis for the regulatory debate about access to price information in financial markets.
The Model
Trade in our economy takes place at two dates, t = 0, 1. Trade at date 0 generates the price that the exchange can sell to traders. Our primary interest is in date 1, where trade takes place between potentially differentially informed traders. There are two tradable assets: one risk-free asset, cash, which has a constant value of 1; and one risky asset which has a price ofp t per unit at date t and an uncertain future value, to be realized at the end of period 1, denotedṽ. We assume thatṽ ∼ N (v, 1/ρ v ) withv > 0 and ρ v > 0.
At each date, there are two types of traders: rational traders and noise traders. We assume that no one trades at both dates. Our motivation for this assumption is that date 0 can be thought of as an opening call and then at date 1 normal trade begins. This assumption can also be motivated as an outcome of high frequency trading in which traders may choose not to engage in immediately repeated trading when facing significant transaction costs. Our assumption that different traders trade at each date has two important implications for our analysis. First, we do not have to take into account the possible inventory positions of those who are in the market at date 1. Second, we do not have ask whether date 1 traders must know date 0 price because of their knowledge of the date 0 equilibrium.
At each date, there is a [0, 1] continuum of rational traders who derive expected utility of wealth at the end of period 1 from CARA utility functions with a coefficient of γ. Noise traders provide liquidity in the sense that they supplyx t units of the risky asset per capita to the market. We assume that
The assumption that the mean per capita supply of the asset is positive is important for our results. If it is instead 0, then on average there is no aggregate risk to be borne, and in equilibrium no one will be rewarded for bearing it. We believe that the pricing of aggregate risk is important, so we choose to focus on the case in which it exists.
At each date t, each rational trader i observes a private signal regarding the payoff of the risky asset:
We assume that all the underlying random variables(ṽ, ε
In addition to her private signal, each rational trader also uses her knowledge of how prices are determined in computing her demand. That is, when trader i submits her demand schedule to the market, she decides how much of the risky asset she wants at each price if that price happened to clear the market. This is a standard rational expectations equilibrium construction as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980 
The date 0 pricep 0 aggregates the signals of date 0 traders and so it is valuable to date 1 traders. Before the market opens at date 1, the exchange offers to sell this price to the date 1 traders at price q. Suppose that a fraction µ ∈ [0, 1] of date 1 traders decide to purchase this signal. We call these traders price-informed ; the traders not purchasingp 0 are called priceuninformed. Both q and µ will be endogenously determined: µ is determined by comparing a trader's expected payoff of staying price-uninformed versus that of becoming price-informed; q is determined by maximizing the profit of the exchange. 
Equilibrium
We first compute the date 0 equilibrium pricep 0 . Standard calculation, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , shows that there is a linear rational expectations equilibrium in period 0, as specified by Lemma 1. Lemma 1. There exists a partially revealing rational expectation equilibrium at date 0 with price functioñ
A simple linear transformation shows that the date 0 pricep 0 is equivalent to the following signal about the asset payoff (ṽ):
Next we determine the date 1 pricep 1 .
Date 1 equilibrium
Suppose that date 1 traders conjecture the following price functioñ
In this price funciton α x measures the effect of noise trading on prices. It captures the market depth, and hence we use its reciprocal, 1/α x , to measure liquidity of the market. More liquid markets have a smaller α x and so α x characterizes market liquidity in much the same way as the Kyle λ. Price-informed Traders. When a price-informed trader i chooses her demand schedule DI (p 1 ;s 1 i ,p 0 ), she incorporates the information contained in prices implied by the price function (equation (5)) and thus she effectively has the information set {p 1 ,s
She maximizes her expected utility conditional on this information:
The Kyle λ is the ratio of the absolute value of price change to volume, see Kyle (1989) .
andW i is her initial wealth. The solution is her demand function:
To write her demand function in explicit form, it is useful to compute her conditional moments of the distribution of the asset's value. The information contained in the price is equivalent to the following signal:
which is normally distributed with meanṽ and precision ρ θI given by
Thus,
V ar ṽ|p 1 ,s 1 i ,s p = :
Her demand function is thus
Price-uninformed Traders. A price-uninformed trader i has the information set {p 1 ,s
The price-uninformed trader does not observe the signals p so for her the information contained in the current pricep 1 is equivalent to the signal:
which is normally distributed with meanṽ and precision ρ θU given by
Her conditional moments of the distribution of the asset's value are
V ar ṽ|p 1 ,s
Her demand function is
Price function. Substituting the demand functions (given by equations (11) and (17)) and the expressions forθ I andθ U (given by equations (7) and (13)) into the market clearing condition (equation (2)) and solving forp 1 , and checking the conjectured form of the price function yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
There exists a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium at date 1, with price functioñ
where
The cost of capital
We next use the equilibrium price to analyze how the fraction of priceinformed traders affects the cost of capital. First, we ask how exogenous changes in µ, the fraction of price-informed traders, affects the cost of capital. The cost of capital is
The effect of changes in the fraction of price-informed traders is given in the following corollary. Corollary 1. As more date 1 traders become price-informed, the cost of capital at date 1 decreases; that is
This result is driven by two effects of an increase in µ. The direct effect follows from the fact that price-informed traders view the risky asset as being less risky than do the price-uninformed traders and thus they have a higher average demand than the price-uninformed. So as more traders become price-informed the price of the risky asset increases. The indirect effect occurs through the impact of a more informative price on the demand of the remaining price-uninformed traders. The derivative of the precision of the beliefs of the price-uninformed traders with respect to µ (given by equation (47) in Appendix A) is ∂ρ θU ∂µ > 0.
As more traders acquire the previous price, the current price reveals more information to those who do not acquire the previous price. As a result, the remaining price-uninformed traders also face less risk and they, too, demand more of the risky asset thereby increasing in its price.
One important consequence of this corollary is that the cost of capital is at its lowest if all traders are price-informed and, conversely, at its highest if no one is price-informed. So the cost of capital is minimized if exchanges are required to provide past prices at zero cost to everyone, and its maximized if they do not report past prices. Note that this result takes the amount of information in the market (the signals) as exogenous. Whether information about past prices is available or not affects the value of private information. If individuals have to expend effort or cash to obtain and understand how to use their private information it can affect the total amount of information in the market. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 5 in which we endogenize the choice of whether to obtain private information.
The price-informed versus price-uninformed decision. The equilibrium fraction of traders who purchase the price is determined by comparing the indirect utility of a price-informed trader with that of a price-uninformed trader. The indirect utility of a price-informed trader is:
Applying a similar argument as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and using the moment generating function of the Chi-squared distribution, we can integrate out the signalp 0 (ors p ) and obtain her expected indirect utility prior to observingp
are given by equations (16) and (10) .
The indirect utility of a price-uninformed trader is
Thus, for any realization of signal,s 1 i , and period 1 price,p 1 , the expected indirect utility of a price-informed trader is a constant multiple of the indirect utility of a price-uninformed trader
and so
Note that the price information purchase decision is independent of the trader's own private signals 1 i . This follows from our CARA-normal structure which also implies that the price information purchase decision is the same no matter whether this decision is made before or after the private signals (16) and (10), we have
is increasing in µ and is less than ρ I (priceuninformed traders know less than price-informed traders). Thus, the function B (·) is decreasing in µ and its value is greater than 0 for µ ∈ [0, 1] (A proof is given in Appendix B).
For q near zero, every trader will become price-informed. The exchange can sell price information to all traders at any information cost q up to q 1 ≡ B (1), so it clearly will never charge less than q 1 . If the exchange increases the information cost beyond q 1 , fewer traders will chose to become informed and the demand for the price information µ (q) is determined by
Alternatively, if the exchange charges too much, q 0 ≡ B (0), it will not be able to sell the price information to anyone. Thus, the exchange's decision problem is max
which is equivalent to the problem
Let (µ * , q * ) denote the solution to the exchange's profit maximization problem, where µ * = B −1 (q * ) and q * = B (µ * ) are the equilibrium fraction of traders who decide to become price-informed and the equilibrium information cost charged by the exchange.
There are two possibilities for the optimal (from the point of view of the exchange) µ * : µ * = 1 or 0 < µ * < 1. The following proposition provides a characterization of the parameters for which µ * is 1 (the proof is provided in Appendix C). The effect on profit of an increase in µ depends on whether this increase affects the price the exchange can charge. If it does not affect the price of information, then its clearly optimal to increase µ. Alternatively, to increase µ the exchange may need to reduce the price of information. When the risk aversion parameter γ is large, the negative effect on profit from reducing the price of information is dominated by the positive effect from selling the information to more traders. A larger µ reduces this benefit because the current market pricep 1 becomes more informative; however, if γ is large, traders trade less aggressively and hence the current market price reflectss p and aggregatess 1 i less effectively, making the current market price less sensitive to µ. So a large γ weakens the price effect of increasing µ. Proposition 2. When the risk aversion parameter γ is sufficiently large, the equilibrium fraction of price-informed traders is 1 (i.e., µ * = 1) and the equilibrium price of information is q * = B (1). 5 In Panel (a), the optimal µ * is interior, i.e., µ * = 0.0503, and the corresponding price of information q * is 0.0355, delivering a profit of 0.0018. In Panel (b), the optimal fraction of price-informed is µ * = 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 4 Welfare Implications
We denote the equilibrium price of the risky asset resulting from the exchange's optimal charge q * byp 1 * . This price is obtained by setting µ = µ * in Proposition 1. In an equilibrium, the indirect utility of a price-informed trader is
The exchange will set an information price such that each trader is indifferent between staying price-uninformed and becoming price-informed. After integrating out the signalp 0 , the equilibrium indirect utility of any rational trader is
The welfare of rational traders is the expected value of the equilibrium indirect utility; that is, the welfare is evaluated prior to knowledge of the random variablesp 1 * ,p 0 ,s 1 i andW i . In principle, initial wealthW i can be random if traders hold some background risk or if traders are endowed with shares of the risky asset. An endowment of the risky asset would make wealth depend onp 1 * which is random. For simplicity, we follow Leland (1992) , who uses a Grossman-Stiglitz type model to study the welfare implications of insider trading, and assume thatW i = 0, so that any price-induced wealth change is absorbed by the noise traders in our economy. 6 The welfare (certainty equivalence) of the rational traders is therefore:
An explicit form for
is given by equation (49) in Appendix D, which is obtained by using the moment generating function of a noncentral Chi-square distribution. Appendix D shows that W EL * R can be rewritten as follows:
The welfare of the noise traders is defined to be
The revenue that a noise trader receives from sellingx
is thus the negative of the expected opportunity cost E [(ṽ −p 1 * )x 1 ] associated with a trade ofx 1 shares. We use expected revenue to measure the welfare of noise traders to capture the idea that they prefer to realize their unmodeled hedging or liquidity needs at the smallest possible expected opportunity cost.
The welfare of noise traders can be decomposed into two parts as follows:
Trading the risky asset has two effects on noise traders. First, by selling the asset, noise traders forgo the future cash flowṽ per share and instead obtain a revenue equal to the current pricep 1 * . So the per share cost of their trade is E (ṽ −p 1 * ), i.e., the cost of capital. Noise traders trade an average ofx 1 shares per capita, and as a result, their average cost is E (ṽ −p 1 * )x 1 . Second, when noise traders trade, they move prices according to the price function (5). So buys (sells), trade at a price greater (lower) than average by an amount equal to the coefficient of α x in the pricing function. This generates a transaction cost paid by noise traders of α x V ar (x 1 ) per capita.
Benchmark economies
We compare the economy specified in the previous section, labeled Economy D, where "D" refers to "differential price information access", with two benchmark economies, Economy I and Economy II. In Economy I, the exchange discloses the informationp 0 to the public at no cost (perhaps because of SEC regulations), while in Economy II, no previous price data is available.
In Economy I, the date 1 price is determined by setting µ = 1 in Proposition 1 and we denote this price byp 1I . In this economy all traders are price-informed, and their indirect utility is
After integrating out the signalp 0 , we have
The welfare of a typical trader when information is free, equation (30), differs from the equilibrium welfare of a trader in Economoy D who chooses to be price-informed, equation (24), for two reasons. First, the price of the risky asset differs in the two economies: pricep 1 * in Economcy D andp 1I in Economy I. Second, the term γq * does not appear in equation (30) because traders do not have to pay to observe past prices in Economy I.
These two welfares can also be compared prior to observing past prices. In this case we compare equation (32) 
is given by equation (49) withp 1 * replaced byp 1I . The welfare of the typical noise trader is again measured by:
The welfare comparison between Economy D and Economy I is simple if the exchange optimally sets µ * = 1. In this case, the two economies are nearly identical; the only difference is that each rational trader transfers an amount of q * = B (1) to the exchange in Economy D. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose µ * = 1. Relative to an economy in which all traders can observe previous prices at no cost (Economy I), the economy with differential access to previous price information (Economy D) produces identical price functions, the representative rational trader's welfare (certainty equivalence) decreases by B (1), the welfare of noise traders is identical in the two economies and the exchange gets a profit of B (1).
In the second benchmark economy (Economy II), no one is able to observe the previous pricep 0 . The date 1 price is denoted asp 1II and it can be computed by setting µ = 0 in Proposition 1. It can also be easily verified that α p = 0 in the equilibrium price function (equation (5) 
Comparing equation (35) with (25) shows that relative to Economy II, the welfare of the rational traders in Economy D is different only to the extent that the equilibrium date 1 pricep 1 * is generally different fromp 1II . This makes sense since in Economy D, the exchange sets the cost q * such that all traders are indifferent between becoming price-informed and staying price-uninformed, and as a result, the welfare of any trader in Economy D can be represented by the welfare of a price-uninformed trader.
The welfares of the rational trader and the noise trader in Economy II are
where the expression of E V U II p 1II ,s 
Implications of differential access to price information.
The complexity of the various expressions for welfare in different economies precludes simple analytical analysis. Instead we use numerical analysis to examine the implications of selling price information. The parameters chosen are given in Table 1 and are borrowed from Leland's (1992) calibration. Since Leland's original calibration is based on annual S&P500 data, our results should also be interpreted on an annual basis, although our economy tries to capture high frequency trading and hence the length of one period is much shorter.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The expected payoff of the risky assetv is normalized to 1. The ex ante payoff precision ρ v is 25, which gives an annual volatility of about 20%. The risk aversion parameter γ is 2. We normalize the per capita supply of the risky asset to 1 in each period, so thatx 0 =x 1 = 1. The precision of the noise supply is set to 10 at each date, that is, ρ 0 x = ρ 1 x = 10, which corresponds to an annual volatility of liquidity supply equal to about 30% of total supply. We follow Gennotte and Leland (1990) in setting the rational trader's signal-to-noise ratio as 0.2, i.e., ρ Table 2 reports the results of our numerical analysis for this parameter configuration. For each of our economies, we report two groups of results. One group of results consists of the positive implications: the equilibrium fraction of price-informed (µ), cost of capital (E (ṽ −p 1 )) and the liquidity (1/α x ). The other group of results consists of the normative implications: welfare (certainty equivalence) of the rational traders (W EL R ), welfare of the noise traders (W EL N ), the profit of the exchange (π) and the total welfare of the society, which, is defined as the sum of the welfare of three classes of agents (W EL R + W EL N + π). 8 The magnitudes in Table 2 are comparable to those in Leland (1992).
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The equilibrium price function in Economy D is
The equilibrium fraction of price-informed is µ * = 5.03%, which seems reasonable if we interpret the price-informed as large institutions who actively engage in latency arbitrage trading or who exploit co-location to trade in advance of other traders. The equilibrium information cost is q * = 0.0355, which generates a profit of 0.0018 per capita to the exchange. The price functions in Economies I and II are: In these two economies, by construction, the exchange has zero profit.
Comparing these three economies, yields the following results. First, the cost of capital decreases with the fraction of price-informed (µ) traders, while liquidity increases with it. This occurs because as more traders become price-informed, the rational traders as a group trade more aggressively, which increases prices (i.e., lowers cost of capital) and makes prices less responsive to noise trading (i.e., increases liquidity).
Second, rational traders are better off in an economy with less previous price information (a lower µ), while noise traders are worse off. In our economy, rational traders trade for speculation. Thus, as the price system reveals more information, which occurs if more previous price information is present, each rational traders' information advantage due to their private signals 1 i decreases and their welfare is reduced. For example, at the extreme, if the price fully reveals the payoffṽ, then the rational traders will not benefit at all from trading, and thus they lose all of their information advantage. Noise traders are better off in an economy with a more revealing price because the cost of capital is lower and liquidity is higher in such an economy, and both of these effects improve the welfare of the noise traders.
The third result is that total utility increases with the amount of previous price information (µ). This is consistent with Leland (1992) who finds that insider trading decreases total welfare if asset prices do not affect real investment.
Endogenous Information Acquisition
In this section we extend our analysis to consider the choice by date 1 traders of whether to acquire private information. Specifically, we assume that date 1 rational traders are not endowed with signals, so that they are identical ex ante. They can purchase two signals,p 0 ands 1 i , at cost q > 0 and c > 0, respectively. As before, the previous pricep 0 is provided by a profitmaximizing exchange. The signals 1 i is the private signal developed by the trader on her own.
There are two information purchase decisions so there are potentially four types of traders and information purchases.
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• PS-informed. This group of traders spend q + c to acquire both signals (p 0 ands 1 i ), and thus their information set is {p 1 ,s
We use µ ps ∈ [0, 1] to denote the mass of PS-informed traders. This group of traders corresponds to the price-informed traders in the previous sections. We use "PS" to label all the variables, such as demand, indirect utility, or welfare, associated with this group of traders.
• S-informed. This group of traders spend c to acquire the private signal s 1 i and their information set is {p 1 ,s
be the mass of S-informed traders. This group of traders corresponds to the priceuninformed traders in the previous sections. We use "S" to label the variables associated with S-informed traders.
• P-informed. This group of traders spend q to acquire the previous price signalp 0 and their information set is {p 1 ,p 0 }. Their mass is µ p ∈ [0, 1]. In our baseline model, there are no such traders. We use "P" to label variables associated with P-traders.
• Uninformed. This group of traders do not have private signals. Their information set is {p 1 } and their mass is µ u ∈ [0, 1]. Of course, µ ps + µ s + µ p + µ u = 1. Since in the previous sections, the label "U" has already been assigned to the price-uninformed traders, we use "UN" to label variables associated with the uninformed traders.
The price function is again conjectured to have the form given in equation (5) . By the CARA-normal setup, computing the traders' demand functions requires computing the first two moments of the forecast ofṽ using the trader's information set. For PS-informed and P-informed traders, the current pricep 1 is equivalent to the signalθ I given by equation (7) . For the S-informed and U-informed traders, the current pricep 1 is equivalent to the signalθ U given by equation (13) . Using these transformations, we can easily compute the demand functions of the four groups as follows:
where ρ θI and ρ θU are given by equations (8) and (14) respectively.
Substituting the above demand functions into the market clearing condition
and solving forp 1 , we have the following proposition, which generalizes Proposition 1 to the environment with endogenous choice of private information.
Proposition 4. In the economy with endogenous private information acquisition, there exists a partially revealing REE at date 1, in which the price function isp
and where
Equilibrium information purchase decisions
We now analyze the information market to determine the equilibrium fraction of each group of traders. Let
denote the indirect utilities of the four groups of traders. Their ex ante expected indirect utilities are
V ar ṽ|p
and the expression of E [V U N (p 1 )] is given by equation (48) in Appendix D.
If all groups were to be present in the market, their ex ante expected utilities would have to be equal
However, this collection of equalities cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
To see the contradiction, we consider whether a trader who has decided to purchase price information will buy a private signal and whether a trader who will not buy price information will buy a private signal. If all four groups are to coexist in an equilibrium then each of these traders must be indifferent between buying the private signal and not buying it. This is not possible as a trader who will buy price information has more information and so gains less from the purchase of a private signal than does a trader who has no other information. The details for this argument are provided in Appendix E. In Appendix E, we also show that depending on the size of c, the equilibrium can be described by one of five cases. This result is summarized in the following proposition. Our primary interest is in asking how the cost of capital is affected by access to price information when the private information that the price aggregates is endogenous. This requires comparing the cost of capital in Economy I where everyone is endowed with the previous price signalp 0 to the cost of capital in Economy II where no trader observesp 0 . The free signal p 0 in Economy I tends to make traders trade more aggressively and lowers the cost of capital. On the other hand, this extra information lowers the incentive to acquire the private information which makes current price less informative. This effect lowers the average trading aggressiveness and hence raises cost of capital. Therefore, the comparison depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects.
In Appendix F, we show that when the cost c of acquiring private information is sufficiently small or large, the first effect dominates. Intuitively, when c is small, most traders choose to acquire the signals 1 i even in the presence of the public signalp 0 . Alternatively, when c is large, most traders would choose not to acquires 1 i independent of the presence ofp 0 . In both cases, the first order effect of introducingp 0 is to increase everyone's trading aggressiveness. On the other hand, when c takes intermediate values, the second effect, the "crowding out effect" dominates; that is, the introduction ofp 0 causes some traders who would be informed in Economy II to decide not to acquire private information, making the price less informative and raising the cost of capital. This result is formalized in the following proposition.
x . The cost of capital in Economy II is lower than that in Economy I if and only if e γc ∈ (A 1 , A 2 ), where A 1 and A 2 are given in equations (52) and (53) 
x is that the precision contained in the previous price is no greater than than the maximum precision contained in the current price. We would expect this condition to be satisfied in a stationary dynamic economy. Proposition 6 shows that whether the exchange should be required to provide public access to its previous prices depends on how difficult it is to collect information on the underlying asset. Table 3 further illustrates these results about cost of capital, liquidity and welfare using the numerical example in the previous section. All parameter values are identical to those in Table 2 . We present results for two possible values of c. Veldkamp (2006) suggests that c = 0.012 based on an annual calibration. We adopt this value in Panel (B). Note that this value is comparable to the equilibrium price information cost q * in Table 2 for our baseline model: q * = 0.0355. Panel (A) presents the results for a lower value of c (= 0.005).
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Proposition 5 implies that for c close to 0, PS-informed and S-informed traders are active, and so the economy is similar to the economy in the previous sections in which traders were endowed with private information. Panel (A) of Table 3 , in which c is close to 0, illustrates this idea as the results are nearly identical to those in Table 2 . Specifically, in all economies, all traders optimally choose to acquire private information, and in Economy D, around 5% of the traders further purchase the price information. The welfare implications are the same except that the welfare of rational traders in all economies decreases by c = 0.005 to reflect the fact that collecting the private signal is costly. This panel suggests that our results in the baseline model are robust to small perturbations of information acquisition cost of c.
As we increase the cost of acquiring private information in Panel (B), the results change. In Economy II, when no previous price data is available, all traders decide to acquire the private signal. But in Economy I, when the private signal is available to everyone, only 0.4764 of traders find it beneficial to acquire it at a cost of 0.012. This is exactly the intuition illustrated previously. When we move to Economy D in which the private signal is also costly, more traders (0.4945) collect private signals; but those who have already acquired the price signalp 0 , find it undesirable to spend the cost of c to gather the private signal; thus, in equilibrium, only S-informed and P-informed are present (i.e., Case (3) in Proposition 5).
This equilibrium information structure has important implications for the cost of capital. The different information structures of Economies I and II have two implications. First, all traders in Economy I observe an extra signal p 0 , which tends to make them trade more aggressively. Second, fewer traders collect the private signal in Economy I, which makesp 1 less informative about v conditional onp 0 , which tends to reduce the aggressiveness of traders in Economy I. Recall thatp 0 is a very precise signal aboutṽ, which makes the first effect dominate, leading to a lower cost of capital in Economy I than Economy II. A similar argument applies to Economies D and I. This ranking of the cost of capital is also responsible for the ranking of the rational trader's welfare, since their welfare is partially determined by how much they can take advantage of noise traders in terms of cost of capital.
Unlike Table 2 , the ranking of illiquidity is not perfectly aligned with that of cost of capital. For the two close Economies D and II, we still observe that when traders trade more aggressively in Economy D, pricep 1 is more responsive to the fundamental rather than the noisex 1 , making the market in Economy D more liquid. However, we also observe that Economy I has the most liquid market although it does not have the lowest cost of capital. This is because when we move from Economies D and II to Economy I, the information structure changes dramatically: Economy I has less private information and hence traders do not learn much from prices, making prices less responsive to exogenous shocks.
This changed information structure is also responsible for the welfare implications for noise traders. In Economies D and II, we see the same ranking as in Table 2 : Economy D has a lower cost of capital and a more liquid market, and hence noise traders become better off. However, the liquidity in Economy I overcomes its disadvantage in the cost of capital, making it the most desirable market for the noise traders. In aggregate, we still see that the total welfare is aligned with the amount of previous price information present in the market. Our analysis shows that allowing exchanges to sell price data to traders can introduce important welfare, liquidity, and cost of capital effects. These effects arise because trade information is valuable, both to the traders who know it and to the exchanges who produce it. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that exchanges want to sell trade data and some traders want to buy it. The question of interest, however, is what should be the regulatory policy regarding the access to and distribution of trading process information?
To understand the context for this debate, it is useful to consider the current situation in both the U.S. and Europe with respect to tape data. As noted earlier, the US has a consolidated tape to which trades and quotes, in principle, must be reported in real time. In practice, some trades (odd lots, for example) are not reported to the tape, and the processing of the trades and quotes that are reported requires some time. Whereas in times past these delays ran to several seconds, in 2008 the average latency of the tape was on the order of 20 -50 milliseconds, and it is now variously estimated at between 5 and 10 milliseconds. 12 In Europe, there is no mandatory consolidated tape (MCT), and exchanges and trading platforms sell proprietary data feeds. Most US exchanges and markets also provide trade data products, and selling information is a significant source of profit for exchanges worldwide.
Two recent developments in equity markets have brought data issues to the fore. Regulatory change in the US and Europe has resulted in a proliferation of trading venues, and trading is now fragmented in both regions across a wide range of trading venues. 13 Because both Reg NMS and MiFid impose best execution requirements, traders and brokers need to know prices in each of these trading venues, setting the stage for increased demand for exchange data, particularly in Europe. Technological change in the guise of high frequency trading has also spurred demand for low latency data feeds from these markets to facilitate the multi-market arbitrage trading strategies pursued by such HF firms. Purchasing "fast data" and co-locating computers to exchange venues allows HF traders to get to markets faster, and with better information, than it does other traders.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) are both currently reviewing their respective market structures with respect to data issues. In Europe, the question under review is whether to establish a mandatory consolidated tape. The focus here is on the role price information plays "in achieving efficient price discovery and facilitating the achievement and monitoring of best execution." 14 In the US, the issue is proprietary data feeds, with the SEC posing the issue as being one of "fairnesss". Specifically, the SEC asks "is the existence of any latency, or disparity in information transmitted, fair to investors or other market participants that rely on the consolidated market tape. The current latency difference is thus determined by the time it takes to process the data at the consolidated level. For estimates of current latency speeds see BATS comment letter April 10, 2010.
13 Reg NMS in the U.S. provided a variety of changes to the routing and prices of orders. Fragmentation was an expected outgrowth of these changes, and with over 40 venues currently trading equities in the U.S. this has clearly occurred. The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFid) came into effect in November 2007. This directive set the template for regulatory changes in Europe which allowed for entry of new trading platforms and other trading venues. data feeds and do not use individual trading center data feeds?"
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Both issues essentially involve questions of differential access to price information, and our analysis provides insights into the debate. Turning first to the overall issue of a mandatory tape, our analysis shows that the cost of capital is lowest and market liquidity is highest when all traders can condition on price information. When traders all have price information, the adverse selection problems that arise with differential access are mitigated and this reduces the risk premium otherwise uninformed traders would require to participate in the market. Whether the market is also achieving more efficient price discovery is less clear, in part because our research shows that providing price information can reduce the demand for fundamental information. Consequently, establishing a consolidated tape in Europe may have the unintended consequence of reducing demand for more fundamental asset information as traders rely more on price-based information. In general, however, market efficiency (i.e. price discovery) is enhanced in equilibrium with greater access to price information and this would appear to be most easily attained with a consolidated tape. Our findings here are thus opposite of those of Cespa and Foucault (2008) , who argue that the optimal market structure would be more opaque with respect to price information.
Whether exchanges should also be allowed to sell proprietary data feeds is more complex. Exchanges defend the practice of selling data by noting that such data is not costless to produce and it allows them to invest in the costly trading systems needed to produce high quality trades and quotes. While the exchanges share in the tape revenues from the consolidated tape, selling proprietary data allows trading venues to better meet the needs of specialized trading groups. BATS (the 4th largest trading venue in the U.S.), for example, actually gives away its data feeds as a competitive inducement to attract high frequency traders to its trading platform. The exchanges further note that access to the data is "fair" in that they are willing to sell data to any or all traders willing to pay for it.
We believe that the SEC's query regarding fairness misses the bigger picture. Selling data in our model does result in some traders doing better than others, and it particularly benefits exchanges. Yet, these redistributive effects are only part of the story. Allowing some traders better information increases adverse selection in the market, and this in turn affects the cost of capital and market liquidity. It is these latter effects that we believe should be the focus of regulatory concern. Fairness, per se, is not necessarily a good goal for market design because market participants are not all inherently equal.
16
In our view, allowing differential access to price information is undesirable because it reduces efficiency and market quality, and the practice should be restricted.
Should the SEC also preclude exchanges from providing other data that is not part of the price and quote montage? Unlike prices which are fundamental information for all traders, specialized information is more likely to be valuable to traders pursuing particular trading strategies. Selling data not in the quote and price montage can potentially lower trading costs for those traders and would therefore seem an acceptable practice. What is interesting to contemplate, however, is that providing information to some traders can have unexpected effects. As Easley and O'Hara (2010) demonstrate, ambiguity can reduce participation in markets. To the extent that traders perceive greater ambiguity attaching to markets which selectively sell data, they can opt to trade elsewhere or not at all.
17 Such an outcome will surely restrict an exchange's data sales without regulatory involvement. 16 The SEC has not traditionally required a "one size fits all" market structure in recognition of the needs that different traders face.
17 Such a situation was alleged to have occurred in May 2010 in Europe with respect to data distributed by Chi-X and BATS Europe. In a report from Themis Trading Arnuk and Saluzzi (2010) alleged that high speed data packages sold by BATS and NASDAQ-OMX allowed purchasers to discern the existence of hidden orders, thereby disadvantaging hidden limit order traders. Disclosure of this practice prompted European trading platform Turquoise to issue a statement to the effect that its data feeds did not reveal such information. Traders subsequently routed order flow away from Chi-X and BATS, causing a dramatic fall in both venues trading volume. Chi-X and BATS subsequently changed their data feeds to limit the data revealed.
We next show that both (ρ κ + ρ θI − ρ θU ) and ∂ρ θU /∂µ are positive, which in turn means that
By the expression of ρ θU in equation (??),
which is positive.
Direct computation shows:
B. Properties of B (·). 
As γ → ∞, we have
x → 0, and
Thus, as γ is large,
Plugging the above expression into π (µ) and using equation (47), we have
Since as γ is large, ρ A similar argument as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) shows that
Therefore,
We next compute the expectation term. By equations (5) and (15),
and variance of 1. Hence Z * R 2 has a noncentral chi-square distribution.
For t > 0 the moment generating function for Z *
. Then,
To summarize, the ex ante expected indirect utility of the rational traders is:
where the second equality follows from equations (43) 
where the second equality follows from equations (42) and (44). If both priceuninformed and price-uniformed-private-signal-informed traders are present in the economy (51) must be satisfied with equality.
From equation (46) in Appendix A, we know that ρ κ + ρ θI > ρ θU , as observing θ I ,s p gives a higher precision than observing θ U , which of course makes sense, sinceθ U is a linear combination ofθ I ands p . By ρ κ + ρ θI > ρ θU , we know that
Thus, if the inequality in (50) is satisfied, then the inequality in (51) will be strictly satisfied. This has two implications. First, in equilibrium, it is impossible to have all four groups of traders, since the coexistence requires that both condition (50) and condition (51) hold with equality, which is impossible. Second, introducing the price signal reduces the trader's incentive to acquire the private signal. This makes sense because the information contained in past prices increases the prior precision and lowers the value of private information.
Next we prove Proposition 5. In this case, the cost c is so low that both conditions in equations (50) and (51) are satisfied. In this case, S-informed and PS-informed are active. The exchange sets q such that E [V P S (p 1 ,s 
The profit is µ p q, and the welfare of the rational traders is E [V S (p 1 ,s This proposition also illustrates an algorithm to compute the equilibrium. To be specific, in each case, define a grid on the possible measures and then compute the profit to the exchange. Then the gridpoints maximizing the profit over the five cases are the overall equilibrium.
F. Proof of proposition 6.
By proposition 4, the costs of capital in Economies I and II are:
where ρ I and ρ II are the average trading aggressiveness in economies I and II, and they are defined as In Economy D, the exchange sells the market price at an endogenous pro t maximizing information price q* and a μ* fraction of traders purchase the data. In Economy I, the exchange publishes the previous price to everyone at no cost, while in Economy II, no previous price data is available. The exogenous parameters are set at the values in Table 1 . This table presents the key positive and normative variables in three economies in which rational traders can purchase the private signal at a cost c>0. In Economy D, the exchange sells the previous price to traders at an endogenous pro t maximizing information price q*. In Economy I, the exchange publishes the previous price to everyone at no cost, while in Economy II, no previous price data is available. In Panel (A), the variable c takes the value of 0.005, and in Table (B) , it takes the value of 0.012. All the other exogenous parameters are set at the values in Table 1 . 
